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1 Introduction 
Over the past decade the food and agribusiness industry has shown a trend 
towards more integrated channels from production to consumers. According 
to Adam Smith's theory of the 'Invisible Hand'1 this is induced by the self-
interest of people and firms, which in a competitive market will lead to the 
most efficient use of resources, i.e. the newly developed, more integrated pro-
duction structures are more efficient in producing particular products than 
others are. In fact, an empirical study by Zanquetto-Filho et al. (2003) showed 
that benefits from operating in a more integrated manner range from cost 
savings and improved customer service to more effective marketing and sales 
growth. Unfortunately, these results were (as is most often the case) based on 
surveys on managers' opinions on the benefits of integration and not on hard 
economic data. So, it is generally agreed upon by business managers that 
more integration yields benefits in one form or another. But is this always 
true? Consider the following two cases: 
The case of the Greenery International 
In the early 90s the Dutch greenhouse vegetables growers faced a major cri-
sis, due to decreasing prices. They became aware that restructuring the 
greenhouse sector, by enlarging, modernising and reallocating firms became 
necessary to face the competition from countries with low cost of production 
like Spain. Beside growers, the marketing channel, dominated by about 20 
auctions and more than 150 wholesalers, had to restructure because it could 
not accommodate the demand side, made up of large international operat-
ing retailers. The answer to this mismatch was a merge of the majority of the 
Dutch vegetable auctions into the 'Greenery International' in 1996, market-
ing 90% of Dutch greenhouse vegetables. The Greenery aimed at being an 
active and responsive marketing organization and increasing the producers' 
share in the consumer expenditures. Therefore, the Greenery experimented 
1 Adam Smith (1723-1790) is most often recognized for the expression 'the invisible 
hand', which he used to demonstrate how self-interest guides the most efficient use 
of resources in a nation's economy, with public welfare coming as a by-product. 
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by unilaterally setting a price for cucumbers and inviting buyers to make a 
bid for specified quantities. The main competitors, the auction ZON and the 
Belgian auctions, reacted by offering the cucumbers at a price that was just 
a fraction lower. As second movers, these auctions could completely sell their 
stock. The Greenery, however, was forced to function as a market clearance 
organization. It had to bear the costs of the mismatch between production 
and consumption, an activity traditionally carried out by the auction. The 
economic performance of the Greenery, as first mover and dominant sup-
plier, became weaker than that of its competitors (based on Bijman, 2002). 
The case of the Dutch pork industry 
The Dutch pork industry exports around 65% of its production, making the 
Netherlands one of the world's five largest pig and pork exporting countries 
in terms of absolute metric tons of pork exported. About 85% of all pork is 
produced according to a chain quality assurance scheme, efficiency gains are 
made through improvements in IT and global per capita consumption of 
pork is on the rise. These factors should point to a successful Dutch pork 
industry with opportunities to consolidate or increase the export position. 
However, environmental policy is becoming stricter and there is increased 
attention to animal welfare and changing consumer demands. Consumers 
not only want convenient, economical, tasty and healthy meat, but also infor-
mation that verifies animal production practices and food safety. Further-
more, because the larger part of exports is in carcasses, the main value-add-
ing part of the supply chain is exported as well. There has also been increased 
competition among the pig meat exporting countries. At the same time the 
Netherlands has experienced an increase in the cost of production, which 
has resulted in the loss of the position of low-cost producer in Europe. A 
restructuring of the industry took place. The genetics and feed industries 
consolidated, the number of pig farmers and pigs decreased considerably, 
and the slaughter and processing industries restructured through merges 
and take-overs. Nonetheless, the Netherlands, being one of the top 8 Euro-
pean pig meat producers, has seen a decrease in production over the past ten 
years and is projected to be the only top 8-country to show a further decline 
from 2001-2002 (based on Boston et al., 2003). 
So, is it true that reconfiguration of production and marketing structures to 
replace arm's length pricing is always more efficient? According to the cases 
above, it is not. If not, is there something we, as economists, can do about it? 
Or is the Invisible Hand actually visible? Is there one or more stakeholder in 
the production chain who actively stimulates reconfiguration of production 
so he can seize more gains, likely at the expense of other stakeholders who 
do not yield such power? To answer these questions, we need to define chains 
and networks and look at the economics behind them. The most commonly 
used term to denote chains and networks involved in production is the term 
'supply chain', which will be used in the remainder of this chapter. 
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According to Chopra and Meindl (2001) a supply chain can be defined as the 
collection of stages involved, directly and indirectly, in fulfilling demand. 
This definition implies that not only producers and suppliers but also trans-
port businesses, warehouses, retailers, and customers themselves are part of 
the supply chain. This definition does not say anything about how these 
stages are or should be organized. This implies that the stages in a supply 
chain can use any form of product exchange (e.g. markets, contracts) to get 
the product to the end-user, or they can choose to incorporate specific tasks, 
like transport or marketing or even go as far as incorporating all stages down-
and upstream the supply chain (excluding consumption of course). For the 
remainder of this chapter we thus need to keep in mind that a supply chain 
structure can range from a collection of competitive firms, using the price 
mechanism on markets, to fully integrated companies, that incorporate the 
entire supply chain. 
While supply chain management is a well-known concept and covered in sev-
eral textbooks (e.g. Stadler and Kigler, 2002; Chopra and Meindl, 2001, Chris-
topher, 1992), the topic of the economics of production chains is a collection 
of theories and research allies that covers (or tries to cover) the economic rea-
soning behind supply chain activities. Trying to explain the organization and 
operations of supply chains requires a thorough understanding of the eco-
nomics involved. Nonetheless, a theoretical framework for the economics of 
supply chains does not exist. The goal of this chapter is therefore to give an 
overview of relevant theories and to try to identify the gaps therein, so we can 
(begin to) explain why the whole is sometimes more and sometimes less than 
the sum of its parts. To accomplish this, we take a production economic 
approach, focussing on the decisions the production chain as a whole and 
participants in a supply chain must make. Other alternatives would be neo-
institutional economics, which attempts to incorporate institutional restric-
tions into theory, or industrial organisation (IO), originated by Coase (1937) 
among others. Even though the latter is closely related to the topic of this 
chapter and thus highly relevant for explaining production chain organiza-
tion, it focuses on the cost of transactions as the source of reconfiguration 
rather than the chain's and firm's objectives and performance. While the IO 
approach has provided, and still is providing us with important insights, 
'... the focus (of contemporary theory) in this effort has led to the neglect of infor-
mation problems that do not involve agency relationships. These are associated 
with planning in a world in which the future is highly uncertain, and they include 
problems of product choice, investment and marketing policies, and scope of 
operations' (Demsetz, 1997). 
While economic growth has led to specialization and differentiation, it has 
also led to the emergence of complicated structures of production chains and 
networks. As Demsetz states, the focus on the configuration of these chains 
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and networks has resulted in a collection of explanations for more or less inte-
gration, all more or less based on the premises of transaction costs. So far, it has 
omitted to thoroughly address issues of product and process choice, risk and 
uncertainty in chains and networks, investment analysis and so on. This chap-
ter shall provide an overview of the neo-classical and business economics of 
supply chains and the opportunities for further research in this area. 
2 Economics of supply chain production 
2.1 Supply and demand 
There would be no need for production if there were no demand for a partic-
ular product. Market demand is represented by the quantities of a commod-
ity that all customers in a particular market are willing and able to purchase, 
depending on price. This curve, represented in figure 1, is the summation of 
individual demand curves and includes customers who drop out as price 
increases and who enter the market as the price declines. Thus, a change in 
price affects the number of customers, as well as the quantity each consumes 
(Tomek and Robinson. 1990). 
Figure i Market supply and demand 
p 
Supply 
Demand 
The supply curve, like the demand curve, is the aggregation of the supply 
curves of individual firms. It represents the effect of a price change on aggre-
gate output. Note that the curves are drawn as being rather inelastic, i.e. sup-
ply and demand quantities are rather independent of price. This is the case 
in the food- and agribusiness, especially in the short run. As the time period 
under study increases, supply and demand become more elastic due to the 
possibility for adjustment. In the case of demand this is due to imperfect 
knowledge, the time that is needed to make changes, behavioural factors, etc. 
(Tomek and Robinson, 1990). Adjustment in supply refers to the time horizon 
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needed to make production decisions, ranging from which product to choose 
(long run) to sell or store (short run). 
It is the supply side that is of interest in this chapter, and the relationship 
between the market supply curve and individual supply curves. In a simple 
one-stage producer-consumer market, at a given price, aggregation of the 
quantities of individual producers adds up to total market supply (figure 2a). 
In the case of more stages of production, e.g. in the case of a producer, whole-
saler and retailer, market equilibria need to exist on the farm output, whole-
sale and retail market. Gardner (1975) described simultaneous market equi-
libria under perfect competition; Heien (1980) extended this research by 
including sector dynamics, and Holloway (1991), in his models, allowed for 
imperfect competition. Simply stated, individual supply curves need to be 
aggregated vertically (figure 2b). In that case, for a given quantity, partial 
prices add up to the final price. 
Figure 2a Horizontal aggregation of supply 
Firm l Q, Firm 2 
Figure 2b Vertical aggregation of supply 
Firm 1+2 
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Demand 
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Consider tomato growers, who offer the amount of Qg tomatoes at price PG, 
wholesalers who offer the trade of Qw tomatoes at price Pw and retailers who 
offer the shop floor for QR tomatoes at price P r . The aggregate is market sup-
ply Q.' which meets market demand at p \ that represents the aggregated 
price PG+W+R • m t r i e left panel of figure 2b a situation with elastic supply is 
shown, the right panel gives a situation with more inelastic supply at the 
level of the grower. This is a typical situation for tomato growers in the Neth-
erlands. Wholesalers and especially retailers are more and more becoming 
players on a world market for tomatoes, which means that they are very flex-
ible in responding to consumer demand. Growers on the other hand, gener-
ally operate in national markets with investment terms of fifteen years. This 
asset specificity restricts their production possibilities in the shorter run, 
making supply at the level of the grower rather inelastic. When the supply 
curve of the wholesaler and retailer remain the same, the end- result is a 
steeper (more inelastic) total supply curve. 
In the second case in our introduction the cost of production for pork 
increased due to environmental and welfare regulations. Due to poor market-
ing of the increase in environmental protection and animal welfare, the con-
sumer does not recognise any added value and will not pay for it. Therefore, 
the price will remain the same, while costs have increased. The supply curve 
in figure 2b shifts to the left and consumers will want to maintain P\ so 
demand will decrease as well, resulting in a lower volume of pork being pro-
duced and sold. 
2.2 From supply curves to production functions 
Individual supply curves are dependent on the underlying input-output rela-
tionship the producer faces, also called production function. The production 
function determines the shape of the marginal and average cost functions 
and thus the level of output where marginal revenue (i.e. price in a competi-
tive market, where the Decision-Making Unit, DMU, is a price-taker) equals 
marginal cost. As is common with micro-economists, one could look at a pro-
duction or network (the DMU) as one single entity with a clear goal that it 
pursues without any wasted effort. In that case we can apply the neo-classical 
economic approach and draw up a production function for our production 
chain analogue to any other production unit. In figure 3 the Supply Chain 
Production Function (SCPF) is presented as the relationship between input x 
and output y. 
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Figure 3 Supply Chain Production Function (SCPF) 
(output) 
y-ffvXt) 
u
 x (input) 
The SCPF represents the production possibilities for the SC and can algebrai-
cally be written as: 
y-JfoW) (i) 
in which y represents SC output, which is determined by variable costs v, cap-
ital k, and labour I. 
The neo-classical production chain is assumed to maximize profits, in a com-
petitive market. This means that it controls the levels of input, and hence out-
put. Furthermore, in the neo-classical world, the chain produces on the pro-
duction frontier, not subject to any form of inefficiency. Up to here, the neo-
classical approach as used for firms suits a production chain fine. Nonethe-
less, when trying to define the SCPF, we run into several problems. First of all, 
a supply chain is really made up out of several firms, all producing on their 
own PF. Even if we maintain the assumption of profit maximization, it is 
highly likely that not every stage of a production chain operates in a similar 
competitive environment. Input, or, in the case of monopolies, output and 
pricing decisions are therefore not equal for all stages. Moreover, these deci-
sions, especially those of monopolists and oligopolists affect the perform-
ance of other participants in the chain. Spengler (1950) first explained why 
everyone suffers from the inefficiency of successive monopolies or oligopo-
lies due to 'double marginalisation' (Spengler, 1950). The phenomenon is 
explained in figure 4. 
241 
THE EMERGING WORLD OF CHAINS AND NETWORKS 
Figure 4 Double marginalization 
M 
TtR \ 
*M \ 
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\ MRM \ MRR-DM \ DR 
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DR represents the demand faced by a monopolist retailer, MRR the corre-
sponding retail marginal revenue curve. Assuming that the retailer has a 
fixed cost of retailing and his only variable cost is purchasing product QJi.e. 
he purchases the product from the manufacturer, turns around and sells it 
to consumers), then the retailers' marginal cost is the manufacturer price pM. 
The retailer, in a neo-classical world, wants to maximize his profits and will 
therefore pursue a quantity q2 at which MRR=pM. The manufacturer is aware 
of this and consequently MRR is the demand curve he faces. Since he is in a 
monopoly position, he will mark up his price to pM, where MCM=MRM Sub-
sequently the retailer will mark up his price where MCR (or pM) = MRR. The 
manufacturer makes a profit PM given by the dark shaded area, the retailer 
earns a profit PR represented by the light shaded area. This is called double 
marginalization because each successive monopoly causes a price distortion. 
This calls for better integration of production chains since the consequence 
of better integration would be that more of the product would be offered at 
a lower price (increase in consumer welfare), while at the same time profit 
for the integrated firm is greater than the sum of the two monopolies 
(increase in 'producer' welfare) (Cotterill, 2001). While integration through 
for instance co-ordination of pricing practices can benefit successive monop-
olies or oligopolies, this does not help those levels of the production chain 
that are in a situation of perfect competition horizontally. The latter case is 
close to reality in the food- and agribusiness (Giraud-Héraud et al., 1999). For 
producers in competitive environments, the optimal solution would be 
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perfect competition for all levels of the chain so that mark-ups do not occur. 
This would also increase consumer's welfare. Policy-makers opt for the sec-
ond solution to the double marginalization problem by means of antitrust 
regulations. In 1995 Gaudet and Van Long reported that the increase in profit 
as a result of integration is dependent on the number of players and the type 
of interaction that is allowed between integrated and non-integrated players. 
This is where the Greenery International (in our first case) misjudged its 
power. Not all auctions had joined the Greenery and no restrictions existed 
on interactions with Greenery-integrated growers or retailers. The decision-
making behaviour of the Greenery was therefore wrongly based on the 
assumption of being a monopolistic upstream supplier. In a recent empirical 
study Cotterill et al. (2001) showed that the problem described above is even 
more complex. First of all, the interaction between firms in a supply chain 
varies considerably with the type of product considered. Second, they empir-
ically show that proportional mark-up behaviour of (monopolistic) retailers 
and linear demand curves do not describe the market reality well. A more 
product (or product category) specific approach is therefore needed (Cot-
terill, 2001). 
Secondly, some of the output of one SC member serves as some of the 
input for another. These intermediate outputs and inputs are associated with 
two SC members, and while one tries to maximize revenues, the other one 
strives to minimize costs. Besides intermediate inputs and outputs, members 
of a SC use inputs and produce outputs that are solely related to that specific 
SC member. These direct inputs and outputs can simply be treated as inputs 
and outputs of the SC, while the intermediate inputs and outputs cannot. 
Thirdly, the production function for a supply chain faces additional costs 
compared with firms. Beside costs associated with production, a supply 
chain is faced with information costs (i.e. the costs associated with informa-
tion exchange between SC members), inventory carrying costs (i.e. the costs 
associated with carrying a quantity of stored inventory; capital costs, inven-
tory service costs, storage space costs and inventory risk costs), physical flow 
costs (i.e. the costs of distribution), and transaction costs (i.e. the costs associ-
ated with transactions between SC members) (LaLonde and Pohlen, 1996). 
These costs have both fixed and variable characteristics and should be 
included in the SCPF. 
2.2.1 Studies on neo-classical supply chain production 
Not many people have looked at a neo-classical solution to modelling produc-
tion chains. George Stigler (1951) was the first, and for a long time the only 
one, to look at vertical organization within the neo-classical boundaries of 
firm and market behaviour. He states that a firm is made up out of produc-
tion processes rather than the classic input output relationship. He further 
assumes that these processes are cost-wise independent and produce fixed 
proportions so all cost functions can be drawn into one graph (Stigler, 1951). 
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This implies that the cost of total production is simply the sum of the inde-
pendent cost curves as is shown in figure 5. 
Figure 5 Aggregate cost curves (Stigler, 1951) 
p 
AC 
In figure 5, process Yj shows increasing returns, Y2 decreasing and Y3 both. 
The U-shaped average cost curve is the sum of the three separate cost-func-
tions. The question now is, when will process Yj spin-off from the firm to 
become a separate industry? According to Stigler this happens when the 
demand for a product is large enough to support a specialised firm, thus fol-
lowing Adam Smith's theorem that the division of labour is limited by the 
size of the market. If Yt is produced separately at a cost indicated by the dot-
ted line, then the remaining average costs curve is represented by the dotted 
AC-curve; the spin-off reduces costs. Stigler's theory is flawed in that it is 
incomplete with regards to a demand curve, the determination of industry 
supply and an equilibrium price. It assumes that the minimum cost combi-
nation determines the structure of the production chain, inherently imply-
ing perfect markets. He makes this assumption because initially, the new 
firm may be a monopoly but the price it can charge is limited by the costs of 
in-house production of the old industry. Output will expand until process Y1 
starts to see decreasing returns to scale and entry into this new industry will 
follow, leading to a competitive structure. 
Recently, Cotterill (2000, 2001) extended Stigler's model to study the reasons 
behind the organization of a food-marketing channel and how a particular 
organization affects the channel's performance. He focuses on imperfect 
competition and market power either as a determinant of or a result of the 
structure of a production chain. He uses game theory to calculate farm-to-
retail price transmission rates, for production chains with different organi-
zational structures. The different structures are due to differences in 
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competitive characteristics of participants, some operating in a competitive 
market, others in an oligopoly or monopoly. The games show that vertical 
structures other than perfect competition depress price transmission. This 
means that consumers do not get signals to alter consumption to abundant 
products. At the same time, upstream producers (farmers in Cotterill's case) 
suffer because their supply situation is ignored (Cotteril, 2001). 
2.3 Production functions and efficiency 
Most SC management textbooks refer to efficiency of supply chains (e.g. Cho-
pra and Meindl, 2001). They often discuss a so-called cost-responsiveness effi-
ciency frontier, which reflects the relationship of the responsiveness of the 
SC to meet consumer's demand and the cost the SC makes to do so. The SC 
must make a trade-off between cost and responsiveness (figure 6). 
Figure 6 Supply Chain Efficiency 
»sc 
sc, 
Supply chain response time (days) 
In neo-classical economic theory all firms are assumed to produce on the pro-
duction frontier as is the case with SCj, SC2, and SC3 in figure 6. In practice 
this is generally not the case as can be seen from the numerous efficiency and 
productivity studies that have been done. One may assume that full effi-
ciency in supply chains is even further off the mark since there are several 
decision-making units that have their own objectives and operate in different 
competitive environments. The other SC in figure 6 is not on the frontier and 
could, by either decreasing cost, increasing response time or both, move 
toward a more efficient production situation. The problem with respect to 
efficiency in supply chains is that beside direct outputs, which are delivered 
straight to the market, a firm also produces output, which is input to a firm 
in the next stage. These intermediate outputs are intermediate inputs to the 
firm in the adjacent stage, next to the direct inputs this firm acquires from 
other suppliers not involved in the chain (Zhu, 2003). Each firm in each stage 
has its own goals and optimization criteria for the intermediate in/outputs. 
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They also produce under different forms of competition within and between 
stages due to the number of firms and power distribution. This does not nec-
essarily contribute positively to the performance of the SC as a whole because 
of counterproductive decision-making, i.e. the producer wants to maximize 
his revenues, while the wholesaler intends to minimize his inputs. Contribu-
tions of Zhu (2003) in this field are a first step towards measuring SC-effi-
ciency (Zhu, 2003). The method is strongly related to analyses on intermedi-
ate goods done by Jaenicke (2000) and Fare and Grosskopf (1996), that look at 
intermediate goods over time-periods rather than levels in a SC. The big 
advantage of this method is that even though the supply chain is viewed as a 
black box, efficiency in terms of response time, transaction costs and even 
environmental and social parameters can be included. Only a few empirical 
studies have been conducted so far. Talluri et al. (1999) used efficiency meas-
urement to determine which suppliers and manufacturers were most effi-
cient before making combinations of them into supply chains (Talluri et al., 
1999). The problem with this method is, and Talluri et al. also indicate this, 
is that the initial selection based on optimization may lead to sub-optimal 
solutions, because a combination with an inefficient partner may result in a 
relatively more efficient supply chain because of better compatibility charac-
teristics of partners. A more extensive study, done by Talluri and Baker (2002) 
focuses again on the design of an efficient supply chain but also includes dis-
tribution characteristics of the SC. Even though the paper aims to design '... 
efficient production and delivery of a variety of products at low cost, high 
quality, and short lead times', it suffers from the same problem as the paper 
by Talluri et al. (1999). Thus, even though the efficiency of supply chains is 
considered highly important, the study of the topic lacks both theoretical 
and empirical research. Research that covers the trade-off between cost effi-
ciency, quality and delivery, is therefore needed. 
2.4 Supply chain accounting and investment analysis 
To assist supply chain members in supply chain decision-making, planning, 
control and performance measurement activities, it is imperative that they 
have information on management and cost accounting across the chain. 
Even though Stigler (1951) assumed independent cost-curves for the different 
processes in a chain, it is recognised here that these processes are interde-
pendent activities in which the performance of one activity affects the per-
formance and cost of other activities. It is comparable with a multi-divisional 
company, where each division works more or less independently. Accounting 
theory for those types of firms will therefore be helpful in the development 
of accounting systems for the supply chain. Saunders (1994) noted that cost 
is an important part of supply chain performance and should therefore be 
managed 'on an integrated basis' (Saunders, 1994). He further emphasised 
the potential for management accounting in the supply chain but failed to 
show how accounting techniques such as activity-based-costing (ABS) or 
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target costing should be implemented, nor who would be responsible for it. 
Furthermore, issues of ownership of information and the distribution of 
expenses were not addressed (Berry et al., 2000). In order to overcome this, 
and to achieve a more strategic approach towards the classical make-or-buy 
decision, Gietzmann (1996) proposes trust and commitment. Attempts are 
made to design accounting systems for supply chains: e.g. Supply Chain Cost-
ing, a method closely related to ABC (Goldbach, 2000, LaLonde and Pohlen, 
1996), target costing (Lockamy III and Smith, 2000; Seuring and Von Ossi-
etzky, 2001; Kato, 1993), and total cost management (Quillian, 1991). Berry et 
al. (2000) give an overview of systems in place and found that supply chain 
thinking had changed management accounting practices but the focus was 
still intra, rather than inter-firm. 
Another issue in supply chains, and closely related to accounting, is invest-
ments in capital assets (quasi-fixed inputs). They make the adjustment path 
of an SC sluggish rather than instantaneous. They also involve risk, because 
firms may become dependent on the existence of the chain they operate and 
invested in (asset specificity). Current static efficiency analysis is based on the 
assumption that a firm is able to adjust immediately and ignores the inter-
temporal linkage of production decisions. An additional complication of 
dynamics in an SC context is that each level of the supply chain has different 
periods of investment, resulting in differences in adjustment costs, likely 
making the chain as slow to adjust as the level with the highest adjustment 
costs. This can be crucial in a time when flexibility of production is needed. 
Conclusion and outlook 
This chapter describes the theoretical foundations of an economic approach 
to supply chains and networks based on neo-classical and business econom-
ics. This approach to supply chain production is rather underdeveloped, even 
though it could provide highly useful insights into the production dynamics 
behind supply chains. Obviously, much needs to be done to answer questions 
of how to theoretically and empirically assess the efficiency of production 
chains and networks and how to improve this efficiency if necessary. Moreo-
ver, this knowledge is imperative if we want to urge the participants in a pro-
duction chain to operate in a manner that would be more beneficial to them 
and to society as well, through increased consumer welfare. The current 
issues of trust, as in the case with the Dutch pork supply chain, and the unfa-
miliarity with theoretical principles, as was the case with The Greenery Inter-
national, would no longer have to occur. 
As Demsetz (1997) indicated, many issues not concerning agency relation-
ships could be addressed using neo-classical and business economics. This 
chapter has provided an overview of theory and the sparse literature 
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available in this field. A further extension would be to look at risk and uncer-
tainty in chains, and the effect this has on, for instance, investments in chain-
specific assets or co-operation between chain partners (e.g. Huirne and 
Hardaker, 1998). Extending production functions to include stochastic ele-
ments (e.g. Hardaker et al.. 1997) or using a state-contingent approach (Cham-
bers and Quiggin, 2000) could provide valuable insights into the effect of risk 
and uncertainty on chains and chain performance. Performance measure-
ment of supply chains is an important issue because it provides insight into 
the relative performance of different organizational structures and helps 
decision-makers with their supply chain decisions. There is a large array of 
measures available (for an overview see Gunasekaran et al., 2001; Lapide, 
2002 and Beamon, 1999) but unfortunately most indicators and/or scorecards 
focus on process optimization and product flow. Furthermore, they are based 
on the goals of individual actors in the chain rather than the optimization of 
the entire chain. Product portfolio-analysis is necessary to explain the differ-
ent structures and performance of supply chains in relation to the nature of 
the demand of the product. According to Fisher (1997) these are primarily 
functional or primarily innovative. Primarily functional products satisfy 
basic needs, predictable demand and long life cycles, which invites competi-
tion and low margins. Innovative products have a volatile demand and high 
margins (Fisher, 1997). Finally, institutional constraints may affect all the 
above. The effect of e.g. taxes on supply chain production and the transfer of 
prices between chain partners can be evaluated using general equilibrium 
analysis incorporating taxes (e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995). 
In conclusion, the authors would like to argue that this overview of neo-clas-
sical and business supply chain economics represents a beginning of a prom-
ising new research area. The fields of Institutional Economics and Industrial 
Organisation focus on the relationships between chain partners, and as such 
have contributed much to the understanding of the emergence of supply 
chains. Expanding neo-classical and business economic theory shall provide 
an understanding of decision-making from a production point of view. 
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